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THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT:
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS AND
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
Stephen Kwaku Asare, Lawrence A. Cunningham and
Arnold Wright
ABSTRACT
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to restore investor confidence,
which had been deflated by massive business and audit failures, epitomized
by the demise of the Enron Corporation and Arthur Andersen LLP. The
Act altered the roles and responsibilities of auditors, corporate officers,
audit committee members, as well as other participants in the financial
reporting process. We evaluate the potential legal implications of some of
the Act’s major provisions and anticipate participants’ likely responses.
Our evaluation suggests that these provisions will significantly change be-
havior, increase compliance costs and alter the legal landscape. We also
identify promising avenues for future research in light of the new landscape.
INTRODUCTION
This paper has four purposes. First, we discuss how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (hereafter referred to as the Act) altered the roles and responsibilities
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of auditors, corporate officers and audit committee members in financial
reporting (Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). Second, we analyze the potential legal
implications of these changes. Third, we anticipate how participants are
likely to react in light of the evolving legal landscape. Finally, we suggest
research opportunities that shed light on the effects of the Act.
Congress passed the Act to rehabilitate investor confidence following a
series of financial frauds (e.g., Enron, Global Crossing, Qwest and World-
Com) that dissipated investment holdings and shook investors’ trust in the
capital markets.1 These corporate failures exposed weaknesses in the ca-
pacity of the corporate governance system for systematically relaying re-
liable financial information to market participants. Each debacle revealed
corporate officers allegedly engaged in deliberate falsification while their
audit committee members and auditors either apparently could not identify
the deception vehicles or looked the other way. For instance, at WorldCom,
corporate officers fraudulently capitalized an expense aggregating to billions
of dollars over several years that went undetected by the audit committee
and external auditors.
Our primary thesis is that roles and responsibilities inform a court’s view
of the appropriate standard of legal obligation to be applied in cases against
a defendant. As such, the expanded roles and responsibilities brought on by
the Act will likely impact the way each participant evaluates potential legal
liability risks. Anticipating changes in culpability levels, we expect partic-
ipants to discharge these new roles in the ways designed to control their
liability risk to an acceptable low level. Importantly, such strategies, while
rational for each participant, may impair the Act’s objectives of improving
the quality of financial reporting. As will be discussed more fully, depending
on the applicable legal standard (e.g., scienter; willfulness; recklessness; and
negligence), the Act may actually lead to lower levels of reporting quality.
As such, the effects must be monitored through empirical research and,
where appropriate, remedial measures, such as amendments or the creation
of safe harbor provisions, must be taken (see also Moehrle & Reynolds-
Moehrle, 2005, for an annotated bibliography of regulation related research
reported in 2003–2004).2
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss
the Act’s changes to the auditing function, consider the likely effect on legal
liability, anticipate auditors’ responses and identify the implications of these
dynamics for future research. This section is followed by a similar analysis
for corporate officers and audit committee members, respectively. The final
section summarizes the major issues identified and their implications for
practice and research.
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THE ACT’S EFFECT ON AUDITORS
Auditors’ Roles and Responsibilities
The primary change in the auditors’ scope of responsibilities is Section 404(b)
of the Act, which requires auditors to attest to, and report on, managements’
assessments of the internal controls over financial reporting (ICOFR), with
the attestation made in accordance with standards issued or adopted by the
PCAOB.3 The client’s ICOFR assertion and its related audit are intended, in
part, to create an early warning system to alert financial statement users to
material weaknesses in ICOFR that may impair an issuer’s ability to prepare
reliable financial statements in current- and future-accounting periods
(PCAOB, 2004; Cunningham, 2004). These mechanisms are also intended
to enhance a company’s control environment to promote reliability of fi-
nancial reporting. Although auditors have always considered a client’s
control edifice as part of the financial statement audit (e.g., see SAS 78), this
consideration was only ‘‘a means to an end.’’ That is, auditors looked to
controls to help them determine the nature, extent and timing of substantive
procedures but were not, per se, interested in forming an independent view of
the controls. In this regard, AS 2 alters the audit terrain significantly.
PCAOB AS 2, the implementing standard, prescribes an ‘‘integrated
audit’’ of the financial statements and ICOFR. Under AS 2, auditors pro-
vide three opinions: one on the financial statements, one on managerial
ICOFR assertions, and one concerning their own ICOFR assessment. The
ICOFR opinions are based upon an independent audit of ICOFR, requiring
the auditor’s opinion specifically on ICOFR effectiveness, with any material
weakness compelling the auditor to issue an adverse opinion with accom-
panying disclosure. The PCAOB defines material weakness as control
deficiencies resulting in more-than-a-remote likelihood of material misstate-
ments in financial reports (PCAOB AS 2, par. 10). A material weakness is
presumably a particularly severe form of ‘‘significant deficiency,’’ which the
PCAOB defines, in turn, as posing more than inconsequential risks for
financial statement reliability (see Table 1).
Table 1. Classifying Control Exceptions per AS 2.
Inconsequential More than Inconsequential Material
Remote Control deficiency Control deficiency Control deficiency
More than remote Control deficiency Significant deficiency Material weakness
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Significantly, an adverse ICOFR opinion is also necessary when material
weaknesses exist that nevertheless do not prevent giving an unqualified
opinion on the financial statements (AS 2, par. 177). In this case, control
reports must explain that the auditor considered the material weakness in
planning substantive audit tests of financial statement assertions and that
the adverse control report did not affect the financial statement audit report.
It is also possible for the auditor to issue an unqualified control report
coupled with a qualified audit report. This requires three things to happen:
(1) the auditor detects a material misstatement in the financial statements;
(2) the client refuses to revise the statements; and (3) presumably the auditor
reconsiders the control decision but concludes that this decision is still ap-
propriate. Finally, because the ICOFR opinion attests to control effective-
ness as at the financial statement date, management has an opportunity to
remediate control deficiencies (whether material or otherwise) identified at
interim periods. The PCAOB does not currently require the report to dis-
close this remediation.
Potential Legal Implications
Section 11 Liability and Attesting to Management’s Assessment of ICOFR
Securities Act Section 11 provides a civil remedy in the case of a registration
statement accompanying an initial public offering that contains ‘‘an untrue
statement of a material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.’’
Joint and several liabilities may fall on an auditor when he takes respon-
sibility for some portion of the registration statement (Soderquist &
Gabaldon, 2004).4
The scope of the auditor’s liability under Section 11 is seemingly narrow
because of the requirement that a Section 11 plaintiff trace the purchase of
securities directly to the complained-of securities offering (see Barnes v.
Osofsky, 373 F. 2d 269 (1967), Barnes v. Osofsky, 1967). That is, remote
secondary and market transactions are not subject to Section 11 claims.
Meeting this burden is difficult (see e.g., Sale, 2000) and could potentially
limit the number of Section 11 claims against auditors (see e.g., Freund,
Fuerman, & Shaw (2002) who present empirical evidence supporting the
paucity of Section 11 claims against auditors). Nevertheless, the tracing
burden imposed on potential plaintiffs is not insurmountable and case law
reveals numerous instances in which plaintiffs have successfully maintained
a Section 11 action against auditors (Hazen, 2006).5 Moreover, even if the
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probability of a successful Section 11 claim against an auditing firm is low,
the magnitude of resulting damages can be large (see Talley, 2006).6
Traditionally, because auditors had no duty to disclose control weak-
nesses or their effects on substantive audit testing in the audit report (see
SAS 78), courts deemed control irregularities immaterial for adjudicating
auditors’ culpability under Section 11. The case of Monroe v. Hughes (1994)
illustrates the current law. In that case, the auditor found internal control
irregularities, conferred with management and expanded the scope of its
financial audit by performing more elaborate substantive testing. The au-
ditor issued an unqualified audit report, but did not disclose the control
irregularities in the audit report. In the following year, the auditor found
significant deterioration in internal controls and was unable to issue an
unqualified financial statement opinion for that year. The client collapsed
and investors sued the auditor under Section 11, claiming that the auditor
should have disclosed in its audit opinion the internal control irregularities it
discovered. The Monroe court (and others facing similar questions) rejected
the investors’ argument, citing Section 11’s due diligence defense, negligence
standard, and observing that good faith compliance with GAAS discharges
an auditor’s professional obligation to act with reasonable care. No legal or
accounting authority required auditors to disclose control irregularities.
AS 2 likely will reverse this rule, since it imposes duties on auditors to
disclose and explain in their reports material control weaknesses and their
effect on the overall audit process (Cunningham, 2004). Although no case
has ensued after AS 2, it seems reasonable to assume that a court answering
the Monroe question, under the new standard, will find an auditor culpable
for failing to disclose a material weakness. That is, auditors must plan their
audit to detect all material weaknesses in the client’s control architecture.
Failing to disclose detected material weaknesses exposes them to Section 11
liability.
Auditors’ Likely Response to Section 11 Liability
If we are correct that auditors can no longer avail themselves of the Monroe
protection, they would have incentives when providing ICOFR opinions to
disclose discovered weaknesses and to err on the side of characterizing
control deficiencies as material when they could alternately be described
instead as significant deficiencies, not requiring disclosure. Although that
incentive seemingly comports with AS 2’s early warning system objectives, it
is likely to be fraught with false positive signals, which ultimately may
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render the adverse opinion less meaningful or result in lower pricing by the
market of public offerings (assuming the market considers the report to be
relevant). Adding to this incentive is a definition of material weakness that
sets such a low threshold that even some well-managed companies are likely
to be ensnarled by the negative ICOFR net (see Table 1). The February 8,
2006 edition of Compliance Week reports that adverse control recipients
for Form 10-Ks (annual reports) filed in January 2005 include Visteon,
Eastman Kodak and SunTrust Bank. Ge and McVay (2005) identified 261
companies that disclosed at least one internal control material weakness in
their SEC filings from August 2002 to November 2004 (SEC, 2003).7 They
report that reported cause for material weaknesses vary from deficient
revenue-recognition policy to inappropriate account reconciliations. Fur-
ther, they report that disclosures vary widely in terms of details.
Section 10(b) Liability and ICOFR Opinions
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 addresses all purchases
or sales of securities and is relevant for all regular filings with the SEC such
as the Form 10-K or 10-Q (quarterly report) (Securities Exchange Act,
1934). Anyone making material misstatements (or omissions), on which
traders rely, faces liability as a primary violator under Section 10(b) when
they have a duty to disclose. Liability is imposed when defendants exhibit
‘‘scienter,’’ generally meaning intent to deceive and commonly understood
as fraud.
An important distinction in this context concerns an auditor’s status as
either a ‘‘primary’’ or ‘‘secondary’’ actor. The Supreme Court holds that
Section 10(b) imposes liability on primary actors (i.e., those directly culpable
in committing fraud), but does not impose liability on secondary actors (i.e.,
those merely aiding or abetting fraud (see Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, 1994). However, the Court also states that this
does not prevent holding auditors liable as primary actors in certain cir-
cumstances. Most courts apply a bright-line rule providing that a secondary
defendant, such as an auditor, must make a false or misleading statement to
the public to be liable under Section 10(b). Absent such a statement, the
actor is an aider and abettor, outside Section 10(b)’s liability reach. A few
courts use a substantial-participation approach, exposing auditors to Section
10(b) liability by attributing another person’s misstatement to a silent
auditor when the auditor’s participation in the activity where the misstate-
ment occurred was so significant that it became directly culpable in the
fraud. In none of the cases, however, has an auditor been held liable as a
primary actor on the basis of omissions.
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PCAOB AS 2 is likely to change the legal landscape. Under that standard,
auditors are required to speak directly in furnishing their opinions on
ICOFR. If they conclude that controls are effective when they are not, the
situation is akin to that occurring when they inappropriately conclude that
financial statements are fair and conform to GAAP. In this case, they
may be seen as secondary actors, insulated from Section 10(b) liability (see
Cunningham, 2003).
Under AS 2, auditors must describe material weaknesses, their actual or
potential effects on financial statements and on related control objectives,
and their effects on the auditor’s financial statement audit. The direct and
involved declarations of a material weakness(es) may trigger a primary-
actor status under any of the various formulations of the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Section 10(b) (see Cunningham, 2004). They are certainly
within Section 10(b)’s reach under the substantial participation approach,
and likely render auditors primary actors under the bright-line rule favored
by most courts. Thus, it appears that AS 2 increases auditor legal risk when
they ‘‘speak’’ about material weaknesses.8 However, in a paradoxical sit-
uation, when they are silent by not identifying material weakness, auditors
arguably maintain their secondary-actor status, therefore leaving legal risk
unchanged.
Auditors’ Likely Response to Section 10(b) Liability
If an auditor issuing an unqualified control opinion is a secondary actor
insulated from Section 10(b) liability, while an auditor issuing an adverse
opinion explaining material weaknesses is a primary actor subject to Section
10(b) liability, then auditors have clear legal incentives to prefer the former.
For control deficiencies at the border (likely to be numerous because of
vague guidance under AS 2), this situation induces auditors to characterize
control weaknesses as significant deficiencies rather than material weak-
nesses. This bias undermines AS 2’s goal of providing an early warning of
potential problems in the reliability of future financial statements. It also
conflicts with the opposite effect arising for public offerings under Section
11, which induces auditors to err on the side of designating close cases as
material weaknesses.
Combined Effects of Sections 11 and 10(b)
The two effects of Sections 11 and 10(b) cannot be counted on to offset each
other. The statutory Sections address different circumstances and provide
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different legal standards and procedures. Section 11 covers only registration
statements, whereas Section 10(b) covers all matters in connection with the
purchase and sale of securities. For disclosures outside registered offerings,
where Section 11 does not apply, Section 10(b) effects are not offset by the
opposite Section 11 incentives. To the extent auditor behavior is influenced
by applicable legal liability risks, Section 10(b)’s incentives could bias au-
ditors’ decisions to resolve uncertain cases as significant deficiencies rather
than material weaknesses.
Penalties for Violation of the Act
Under Section 3 of the Act, a violation of the Act or any rule of the PCAOB
shall be treated for all purposes in the same manner as a violation of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Exchange Act, 1934). Any
person who willfully violates any provision of the 1934 Act (therefore
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) shall upon conviction be fined not more than
$5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, except that when
such person is a person other than a natural person, a fine not exceeding
$25,000,000 may be imposed. However, no person shall be subject to
imprisonment for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he
had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
Research Implications of the Act
The prime driver of the Act was the need to restore investor confidence.
Thus, a key research question is whether ICOFR reports do, in fact, increase
investor confidence, serve as an effective early warning signal and/or provide
important incremental information beyond the financial statement audit.
Although these potential benefits provide the impetus for the Act, the lim-
ited empirical evidence that is present suggests that these benefits may not be
realized. Specifically, Wallace (1982) surveyed various user groups to assess
the effect of audit reports on internal controls. A majority of the respond-
ents were opposed to auditor reporting on internal controls and believed
that such reports would lead to increased costs due to additional audit
services and associated liability risk as well as incorrect beliefs about po-
tential fraud. Nearly two decades after her survey, Hermanson (2000) found
that respondents believed that mandatory audit reports on controls would
lead to improved controls and oversight of controls but felt less strongly
about the information value of these reports. On the other hand, the FDIC
Improvement Act of 1991 requires management and auditors to attest to the
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quality of internal controls of banks (see Hermanson, 2000), and Congress
appeared confident that the ICOFR report is value relevant.
In a recent empirical study, Ogneva, Subramanyam, and Raghunandan
(2006) investigated the effect of receiving an adverse ICOFR report on
implied costs of equity by comparing a sample of firms that received an
adverse ICOFR report to a control sample of firms that received clean
reports. They found that firms that received the adverse ICOFR report had
a modestly higher implied cost of equity – ranging from 26 to 126 basis
points – than firms that received the clean report. However, after controlling
for analyst forecast bias and firm characteristics identified by prior research
to be associated with internal control weaknesses, they report no differences
in the implied cost of capital suggesting that there is unlikely any direct
relation between IC weaknesses and cost of equity.
In contrast, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, and Lafond (2006) found
that firms with internal control deficiencies have significantly higher idio-
syncratic risk, systematic risk and cost of equity capital. They also report
that remediation of an internal control deficiency is followed by a significant
reduction in the cost of equity capital ranging from 50 to 150 basis points.
Similar results have been reported by Beneish, Billings, and Hodder (2006)
who found that firms disclosing an adverse ICOFR report have negative
abnormal earnings in the 3 days surrounding disclosure and a higher cost of
capital. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) suggest that their results differ from
those of Ogneva et al. (2006) because of the use of different cost of capital
measures and the effect of those measures on the samples.
In a related event study, Haidan, Pincus, and Rego (2006) found a neg-
ligible effect of the Act on stock prices. On the other hand, Pankaj, Kim,
and Zabihollah (2003) report that the Act improved market liquidity in the
short-and long-term. Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2004) also report that the pas-
sage of the Act was associated with a reversal in a trend of earnings man-
agement. However, both of these studies did not focus directly on ICOFR.
Going forward, more controlled experimental studies could help reconcile
the conflicting findings.
Further, what are the effects of seemingly incongruous reports (e.g., an
unqualified ICOFR audit report accompanied by a qualified financial state-
ment audit report) on stakeholders, including investors, analysts and the
judiciary? For instance, will investors discount an adverse control report
when it is accompanied by an unqualified financial statement report on
grounds that any errors have likely been detected and corrected? Con-
versely, how will investors interpret an adverse control report that is ac-
companied by an unqualified financial statement report?
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Given the low thresholds set by the standard and the liability implications
under Section 11, clients are highly likely to receive an adverse ICOFR
report accompanied by an unqualified financial statement audit report. For
instance, of the 316 accelerated filers that received an adverse report, almost
all received an unqualified financial statement report.9 Will the proliferation
of these adverse reports dilute their significance or relevance? Will detailed
auditor disclosures avoid diluting the value of these opinions?
Prior research shows that decision-makers are cognitive misers and suffer
from functional fixation (e.g., Hopkins, Houston, & Peters, 2000; Luft &
Shields, 2001). For instance, professional financial analysts are unable to
unscramble the effects of alternative accounting methods when predicting
stock prices (Hopkins, 1996; Hopkins et al., 2000). Moreover, the fixation
effects persist even when there are learning opportunities (Luft & Shields,
2001). This phenomenon is attributed to the development of category
structures in memory, which allows efficient decision making (see Libby,
Bloomfield, & Nelson, 2002). In these structures, attributes are associated
with categories rather than individual instances of the category, leading to
an individual event being interpreted based on its category membership.
While efficient, this strategy can produce errors when the particular instance
does not match the typical category attributes as well.
Because there are a variety of material weaknesses that can trigger an
adverse report, the use of such categorizations to interpret adverse ICOFR
opinions could pose consequences disproportionate to their significance.
While some material weaknesses (e.g., management that is overly aggressive
in the choice of accounting methods to achieve earnings targets) may justify
extraordinary responses from investors, such as their withholding of invest-
ment capital, other material weaknesses (e.g., untimely reconciliation of
intercompany accounts) will arguably not warrant such a severe response.
Although AS 2 requires detailed auditor disclosure tailored to the particular
circumstances, this effort will not yield much fruit if investors functionally
fixate on the presence of an adverse report rather than the content of that
report. The 316 firms receiving adverse reports show that material weaknesses
could exist for a variety of reasons ranging from staffing problems (see e.g.,
the 2004 control report for Eastman Kodak), application of GAAP (see e.g.,
the 2004 control report for General Electric) to weaknesses in specific ap-
plications, such as property, equipment and leases (see e.g., 2004 control
report for American Eagle Outfitters). Thus, an important research question
is whether, and the extent to which, investors distinguish particular instances
of material weakness (i.e., will they encode the specific content of an adverse
report (unscrambling)) or whether adverse reports are treated as the same
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category (functional fixation)? Will stakeholders consider all material weak-
nesses as equally serious or relevant? If not, are we likely to see a new industry
that focuses on granularizing these material weaknesses? Will investors un-
derstand the nature and implications of various detailed control problems?
We noted that AS 2 sets a vague and low threshold for defining a de-
ficiency. As shown in Table 1, auditors are required to classify all control
exceptions into one of the six categories based on their likelihood (remote
vs. more than remote) and magnitude (inconsequential, more than incon-
sequential and material).
There are a wide variety of control types, population characteristics and
types of exceptions. Distinguishing among these control exceptions requires
substantial judgment. Whether a significant deficiency amounts to a mate-
rial weakness depends on the possibility that a material financial misstate-
ment could result. But, how is an auditor to tell whether a control exception
has the potential to lead to misstatements of varying magnitudes? Unlike the
audit of financial statements, which typically requires the auditor to evaluate
a known or projected misstatement,10 the ICOFR auditor must contemplate
the potential of what could happen, in light of an aberrant control. Thus,
descriptive research on how such decisions are made is warranted, as is
normative research on how such decisions should be made.
Compounding this classification difficulty is the requirement that defi-
ciencies be aggregated and their overall effect evaluated. Specifically, AS 2
requires auditors to accumulate and track deficiencies across locations, ac-
counts, processes and assertions and make an overall evaluation of these
disparate deficiencies. But exactly how is this to be done? For instance, how
does one aggregate a deficiency in accounts payable in Division B concern-
ing a complete assertion and those governing acquisitions in Division Y
dealing with authorization issues? Future research could investigate the ag-
gregation processes that auditors use and also develop a model of the
processes necessary to ensure consistent application of this standard. Also,
research that develops quantitative models of the aggregation process may
provide normative breakthroughs.
With what level of consistency will auditors apply these thresholds? For
instance, it is possible that an audit firm will evaluate and describe as a
material weakness what other firms consider a significant deficiency. Will
such initial disclosures set the tone for future periods (for instance, if one
firm issues an adverse ICOFR because of the failure to emplace a process to
implement management’s performance review will this disclosure make such
exceptions a bright-line rule)? If not, how will the profession develop uni-
formity? What role will the PCAOB need to play in the process?
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Under AS 2, auditors have an option to issue either a combined report
(encompassing ICOFR and the financial statement audit) or separate re-
ports. The PCAOB does not explain why there is this choice nor provide any
guidance on when either is appropriate. In effect, the PCAOB assumes that
the reporting options are formally equivalent and should exact the same
effects. Nevertheless, prior behavioral studies consistently show that deci-
sions are not invariant across alternative presentation formats (see Tversky
& Kahneman, 1981; Hirst & Hopkins, 1998; Maines & McDaniel, 2000).
For instance, studies show that the placement of elements of comprehensive
income on a statement of comprehensive income versus the statement of
stockholders’ equity affected nonprofessional investors’ judgment of cor-
porate and management performance (Maines and McDaniel, 2000). Sim-
ilarly, analysts acquire unrealized gain and loss information when this
information is presented in a statement of comprehensive income, but fail to
consider that information when it is presented in the statement of stock-
holders’ equity. While Hirst and Hopkins (1998) and Maines and McDaniel
(2000) show a format effect, the effect was driven by weighting for the
nonprofessional investors and acquisition by the analysts.
Maines and McDaniel (2000) identified five factors that account for the
‘‘format effect’’: placement; labeling; linkage to net income; isolation; and
aggregation (p. 186). Of direct relevance to the AS 2 options is the effect of
aggregation since auditors can issue a combined report (aggregated) or
separate reports (disaggregated). In general, decision makers tend to place
less weight on aggregated data than they place on the same information
when it is disaggregated (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978). For in-
stance, a combined audit report containing an unqualified financial state-
ment report may mask an adverse control report in a way that separate
reports would not. This is so because investors and other users may not be
willing or able to expend the cognitive cost to decode the integrated report.
This raises the possibility that the same control report will be weighted more
when it is included in a separate report than when it is included in a com-
bined report. Thus, future research can focus on how investors respond to
these reporting options, whether the responses vary by investor class (e.g.,
professional versus non-professional), and whether any differences occur as
a result of acquisition, weighting or evaluation.
Given the asymmetric liability risks under Sections 10(b) and 11, an em-
pirical issue arises as to whether more adverse opinions are likely to appear
in connection with registered offerings under the 1933 Act compared to
those accompanying periodic reports filed under the 1934 Act. If so, a pre-
scriptive response appears to be creating safe harbors for auditor disclosure
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to negate the skewed effects of the 10(b) risk and to neutralize any intrinsic
bias (Cunningham, 2004). Given that most information the early warning
system seeks bears a forward-looking character, existing safe harbors pro-
tecting issuers from liability for forward-looking statements could be
adapted to apply to auditor statements required by AS 2.
THE ACT’S EFFECT ON CORPORATE OFFICERS
Officers’ Roles and Responsibilities
The primary role shift for corporate officers is the certification requirements
under Sections 302 and 906. Section 302 requires CEO/CFO certifications of
the financial statements and the effectiveness of controls (including ICOFR
and an SEC-created cognate concept called disclosure controls and proce-
dures), to the best of the officer’s knowledge. Section 906 certifications cover
financial statement compliance with the 1934 Act and fair presentation; the
certification itself is absolute (not according to the officer’s knowledge), but
related criminal liability exists only if the officer knew about a material
misstatement or fraud (and heightened penalties apply for willful as opposed
to merely knowing false certifications).
The officer certifications differ incrementally from longstanding federal
law. Previous law required officers to sign periodic reports and at least a
majority of directors to sign annual reports, but not with specific certification
of the financial statements or controls. What is new, therefore, is the singling
out of these officers, the attestation to particular compliance matters, includ-
ing specific certification of the financial statements and the additional attesta-
tion concerning controls. While legal scholars debate the significance of these
refinements, there seems little doubt that they alter the stakes for officers and
therefore the overall corporate compliance landscape (Cunningham, 2003).
The chief practical goal and effect of Section 906 is to diminish the ig-
norance defense. In the past, noncompliance with the 1934 Act or materially
misstated financials exposed officers and directors to criminal liability, but
only if prosecutors could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such persons
acted with the requisite mental state of scienter, generally meaning an in-
tention to deceive. Requiring these specific certifications is intended to sub-
stantially strengthen a prosecutor’s case that such officers acted with an
intention to deceive (i.e., certification makes the ignorance defense less av-
ailing). Similarly, Section 302 affirmations limit officers’ ability to hide be-
hind the defense of ignorance.
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Raising the stakes for CEOs and CFOs are penalty rules that impose
forfeiture of bonuses if their company must restate its financials due to
misconduct producing material noncompliance with financial reporting re-
quirements (Section 304 of the Act). In such cases, officers will have to pay
back bonuses and stock options received for the year after the related report
was made, along with any profits generated on the award during that year.
This is a novel and proportionate penal scheme, intended to destroy what
many saw as part of the incentives for manipulation, and also to discourage
poor accounting treatments that are the product of mere haste, bad judg-
ment or other carelessness.
Officers’ Likely Response to Litigation Effects
As a practical matter, the chief effect of Sections 302 and 906 is that officers
now insist that subordinates certify what they provide to them (‘‘sub-
certifications’’) (Lipton & McIntosh, 2002). Certifying officers must demon-
strate a basis for the knowledge they reflect in certifications. This entails
elaborate due diligence, involving counsel, auditors, internal auditors, audit
committee and junior officers. This raises the issue of how the new reporting
requirements affect interactions between top management, internal auditors,
and other managers responsible for designing and evaluating controls.
Research Opportunities
Given the Act’s emphasis on CEO/CFO certification, and the corresponding
potential liability, a critical research question is whether there will be a
reduction in the pre-audit probability of management misstatement and
fraud. Certification, investment in controls, and audit committee involve-
ment should reduce the pre-audit probability of fraud; otherwise, these in-
vestments are inefficient. Secondly, because management is required to
assess and report on the controls, they face the same classification and
aggregation problems described above for auditors. Thus, research that
evaluates management control decisions is important. Further, because
management is asked to self-report on its controls, we anticipate a self-
reporting bias, which management can easily justify because of the inherent
imprecision of the ICOFR terrain. It seems unlikely that an investor, who
believes solid controls are essential, will find any solace in a managerial
assessment and report on its own controls. An important research question
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remains whether and how management will signal the quality of their con-
trols mandate. For instance, will/should management create an independent
in-house control evaluation function? If so, will stakeholders reward this
effort? Where management disagrees with an auditor’s conclusion about a
material weakness, is it likely that management will issue an unqualified
control report while the auditor issues an adverse control report? Even
though this is theoretically possible, it seems unlikely as such a disagreement
will only accentuate the adverse control report. Management of accelerated
2004 filers was in concurrence with the 316 adverse control reports issued by
auditors. While this shows ex post unanimous agreement, it leaves open the
question of the extent of ex ante disagreements and auditor–client negoti-
ations.
Presentation issues are also relevant. For instance, AS 2.43 allows man-
agement to document their ICOFR in a variety of forms, including paper,
electronic files, or other media. Further, the documentation can include a
variety of information, including policy manuals, process models, flow-
charts, etc. As discussed, seemingly alternative methods of presentation may
exact different responses by an evaluator. Thus, what is the best format for
management to document their controls to elicit the most favorable assess-
ments from auditors?
The resolution of contentious accounting issues has been recognized as a
negotiation process between management and auditors (e.g., Gibbins,
Salterio, & Webb, 2005, 2001). SOX now adds another layer of potential
disputes in the resolution of whether or not discovered control weaknesses
are sufficiently serious to be considered a material weakness and, therefore,
require an adverse ICOFR report. Further, SOX expands the responsibil-
ities of the audit committee in ensuring sound financial reporting and com-
municating with auditors. Prior research has suggested that audit
committees generally have not been effective in helping to resolve auditor-
management disputes (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2002). However,
SOX’s specific empowerment of the audit committee (as discussed below)
may change this situation. There is little consideration in the negotiation
literature of the influence of third parties on the negotiation process or
outcomes (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000), suggesting a unique
setting for future research.
There is considerable concern about excessive compliance costs. For in-
stance, the PCAOB chairman has noted that ‘‘it is clear that the first round
of internal control costs too much’’ (see PCAOB, 2005). Engel, Hayes, and
Wang (2004) show that the expected cost of compliance with Sarbanes-
Oxley may have driven some companies to remain private rather than go
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public. There is therefore considerable scope for descriptive, normative and
prescriptive research on the management control assessment process. For
instance, descriptive research could document how companies are comply-
ing with Section 404 with a view to identifying best practices. Normatively,
is there an optimal approach to determine which locations the internal audit
team should visit to assess controls? Finally, what is the proper balance of
work between the external auditor and management to avoid duplications
and redundancies?
THE ACT’S EFFECT ON AUDIT COMMITTEE
MEMBERS
Audit Committee Members’ Roles and Responsibilities
Section 301 requires that each member of the audit committee be inde-
pendent.11 The committee’s responsibilities are expanded to embrace the
appointment, compensation and oversight of external auditors. At the same
time, the PCAOB directs auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness,
as part of their evaluation of ICOFR. When auditors conclude an audit
committee is ineffective, AS 2 directs that this be treated as at least a sig-
nificant deficiency and a strong indicator of material weakness in ICOFR.
Further, the committee must establish procedures for the ‘‘receipt, retention,
and treatment of complaints’’ about the company’s accounting, internal
controls and auditing.
Pursuant to Section 407, the SEC issued final rules requiring issuers to
disclose whether they have an audit committee financial expert (and a com-
pany code of ethics) (Release No. 33-8177). Under these rules, issuers must
disclose in the Form 10K whether they have at least one audit committee
financial expert and, if so, the individual’s name. A company may, but does
not need to, disclose that it has more than one such expert. A company
disclosing that it does not have a financial expert must explain why.12 The
objective of this latter provision is to enhance the caliber of audit commit-
tees, given their critical function in promoting the integrity of financial
reporting. However, the goal is not reinforced by any legal rules. On the
contrary, the SEC, in response to concerns raised in comments to the pro-
posed rules, included an express provision stating that designation of a
person as an audit committee financial expert does not impose any such
duties, obligations or liability greater than those imposed on other non-
designated directors. The provision also states that a person so designated is
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not deemed an expert for any legal purpose, including, without limitation,
for purposes of Section 11 of the 1933 Act (Securities Act, 1933).
Taken at face value, these stances mean financial experts, as well as other
audit committee members, will be treated the same as all corporate direc-
tors. This means they owe the corporation duties of care and loyalty. The
duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing and exposes a director’s performance
to meaningful judicial scrutiny; the duty of care requires performing up to
the par of an abstract reasonable person in similar circumstances, and
judges defer under the business judgment rule to a director’s decisions taken
in good faith in the absence of self-dealing. These basic principles of cor-
porate law are unchanged by the financial-expert designation. At most,
however, some courts may find a slightly higher standard of obligation for
what a reasonable financial expert would do as compared to a reasonable
non-financial expert.
Even if this risk were theoretically higher, moreover, the practical risk is
not. In the modern era, virtually no outside director (and all audit com-
mittee members must be outside directors) has ever been held personally
liable for money damages for violating basic vigilance duties, such as the
duties of loyalty and care (Black, Bernard, Cheffins, & Klausner, 2003).13 A
combination of judicial deference, exculpatory charter provisions, insurance
and indemnification prevents this liability. Thus, the odds of this new des-
ignation actually changing behavior as a result of legal risks are very low
indeed.
On the other hand, lawyers advising the audit committee members (and
others) tend to exaggerate legal risks (Langevoort & Rasmussen, 1997). In
the Act’s aftermath, such highly cautionary advice became commonplace
when law firms advised clients on corporate governance matters. Lawyers
overestimate legal risks partly motivated by self-interest, including over-
stating the consequences of new legal developments and overselling the
contributions they can make to manage the fallout. These effects may en-
hance corporate governance integrity and performance, but also may impair
optimal risk-taking and produce sub-par results. This is because the Act
itself did not create a safe harbor provision, which would make it clear that
designated experts are not exposed to potentially increased liability. It is also
possible that a designated expert may believe that the due diligence defense
is less availing.
Section 301(5) also mandates that each audit committee shall have the
authority to engage independent counsel and other advisers, as it determines
necessary to carry out its duties. This is an unusual provision with unclear
legal ramifications. On one hand, board committees always have these
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powers under state corporation law and since corporations must act through
agents (like audit committees) such agents are always separate legal entities
from the corporation. On the other, specific federal directives also author-
izing the audit committee may be treated, in a particular case, as establishing
normative behavior, the departure from which (for example, failing to retain
such advisors in recognized circumstances) may be treated as a factor tend-
ing to support claims against those committees and members.
Audit Committee Members’ Likely Response to Litigation Effects
Two issues arise concerning the liability effects on directors of auditor
evaluation of audit committees. First, auditors evaluating audit committee
effectiveness may expose audit committee members to liability for violation
of fiduciary obligations. Suppose an auditor evaluates a corporation’s audit
committee as ineffective. Whether or not fraud exists within the corpora-
tion, shareholders are now armed with a theory of liability against those
directors. While, traditionally outside directors have little to fear from such
liability risks, this could nevertheless lead auditors to unduly lower the
requirements they insist that audit committees meet before drawing a fa-
vorable assessment. This bias cannot be counted on to offset the bias created
by auditor liability risk. Rather, taken together they may exacerbate con-
flicts.
Second, auditors evaluating audit committee effectiveness may expose
themselves to liability for violation of professional standards. Suppose an
auditor evaluates a corporation’s audit committee as effective. Subse-
quently, a major financial fraud is uncovered within the company. Auditors
are likely defendants in lawsuits by shareholders now armed with an ad-
ditional liability theory. This auditor liability risk may unduly raise the
requirements auditors insist that audit committees meet before drawing a
favorable assessment. Taken together, this could accentuate conflicts of in-
terest between the audit committee and auditors.
Implications for Research
Numerous potential research issues arise. First, a potential research ques-
tion is the extent to which Section 407 of the Act, and related legal advice,
will lead audit committee financial experts to see themselves as bearing
additional legal duties in performing their audit committee functions. While
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the Act and accompanying SEC rules deny this result, risk-averse lawyers
and risk-averse financial experts on audit committees may view their tasks
differently. In addition, market participants, including D&O insurers, may
rank this obligation higher than the legal regime intended it to be set. As a
result, two approaches to studying this issue appear promising. First, a
study of insurance premiums may be an indicia of potential liability (Core,
2000). Second, experimental studies using judges or surrogates such as
practicing lawyers or law students is an approach to gauging the direction of
a court. Third, audit committee members could be surveyed or placed in an
experimental setting to determine their views or actions in the face of po-
tential liability in serving as a financial expert and how this affects their
approach to their functions.
The SEC rule allows registrants to indicate that they have no financial
expert. Further, research shows that the market reacts positively to an an-
nouncement that a financial expert has been appointed to the audit com-
mittee (e.g., Davidson, Xie, & Xu, 2004). It will be important to study the
profile of firms that choose this option and whether that choice is value-
relevant (i.e., how does the capital market respond to registrants who an-
nounce that they have no such experts?).
Third, auditors are hired by the audit committee and yet must evaluate
the audit committee as part of ICOFR. This basically shifts the prior au-
ditor/management relationship to auditor/audit committee. How does the
conflict affect the ICOFR audit? For instance, how well do audit committee
members respond when auditors opine that they are ineffective? How does
this potential conflict impact the effectiveness of interactions between the
auditor and the audit committee in exchanging information and promoting
quality financial reporting?
CONCLUSION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act established a regulatory framework that redefined
the roles and responsibilities of external auditors, corporate officers, and
audit committee members. This paper outlines the new roles and respon-
sibilities and their potential impact on the legal terrain. In so doing, we also
anticipate strategies participants may pursue and their likely effect on the
Act’s stated goals. Four themes emerge.
First, an important change for auditors is the PCAOB AS 2 implemen-
tation of Section 404(b), which calls for an integrated audit of ICOFR and
the financial statements. It is generally assumed that this requirement will
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provide an early warning system for investors of the quality of financial
reporting. Yet the guidance given to auditors is imprecise and the reporting
choices yield seemingly incongruous outcomes. What is clear is the addi-
tional compliance cost (see below) for registrants.
With respect to cost, a survey by the Financial Executive Institute (FEI,
2005) reports that in the first year companies spent an average of $4.4
million to comply with Section 404.14 Costs include an incremental fee for
the annual Section 404 auditor attestation of 38% over current audit fees. In
comparison, a subsequent survey conducted by the FEI (2006) a year later
indicates that total average costs fell about 16% ($3.8 million) when com-
pared to the first year. Nonetheless, respondents, representing corporate
management, believe the costs are still excessively high, especially for
smaller companies. What pressures will be exerted to further reduce these
costs over time?
Second, corporate officers face a maze of criminal liabilities and poten-
tially new liability risks as they navigate certification, disclosure and doc-
ument retention responsibilities. Whether this threat is enough to elicit the
desired corporate conduct sought by the Act remains to be seen and likely
hinges, in part, on a cost–benefit calculus that is difficult to model. Further,
management’s role in designing, testing and documenting the control ar-
chitecture is intended to be a durable feature of corporate reporting; but
absent a rational process to implement this elaborate scheme this could lead
to unwarranted enforcement actions and financial disclosures.
Third, audit committees have oversight responsibilities for financial re-
porting and auditing, and members must ensure that they meet the inde-
pendence and expertise requirements. Audit committees are empowered to
engage independent advisors, the effects of which are uncertain. The des-
ignated financial expert is expected to be able to apply GAAP to estimates,
accruals and reserves and must have experience in financial statements sim-
ilar in complexity to those of the subject company. Despite these require-
ments, the SEC carefully emphasized that the designation does not impose
additional liabilities beyond those faced by other directors. Judges, however,
may not find this interpretation satisfactory and would not necessarily feel
bound to follow the SEC’s position.
In all, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a landmark piece of legislation that is
intended to alter the roles and responsibilities of management, auditors and
directors. With such changes it is important for policy setters, researchers
and Congress to evaluate how the Act changes the behaviors of these parties
in response to altered legal responsibilities and risks and, in so doing,
whether the Act fulfills its objectives. This paper provides an evaluation
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and dialogue on this important issue and suggests promising avenues for
study.
NOTES
1. Whether the loss of confidence is justified is subject to debate. For instance,
Thompson and Larson (2004) suggest that the widespread loss of investors’ con-
fidence in financial reporting does not seem justified based on evidence from 2001
restatements.
2. Safe harbor provisions are imperfect inoculations, even when provided by
statute. Safe harbors articulated by administrative agencies, such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), are even more vulnerable to plaintiff attack and
judicial interpretation. Further, federal safe harbor provisions do not necessarily
apply to actions brought under state law (though the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 and the Securities Law Uniform Standards Act of 1998 effec-
tively made federal courts the exclusive forum for litigating public-company secu-
rities fraud actions).
3. Other significant changes entail: Title I, which created the PCAOB as a new
oversight regime for auditors of public companies, ending the prior self-regulation by
the AICPA (see Carmichael, 2004); and Title II curtailing the scope of non-audit
services and emplacing a mandatory partner rotation scheme. Mandatory audit firm
rotation was also considered as a reform to enhance independence, but was not
included in the act. Rather, the GAO was tasked to conduct a study on the potential
effects of such a reform. The study by the GAO concluded that mandatory audit firm
rotation may not be the most efficient way to strengthen auditor independence and
improve audit quality (GAO, 2003).
4. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA, 1995) did not extend
proportionate liability to auditors under the 1933 Act.
5. Hazen provides several illustrations. For instance, In re American Bank Note
Holographics Securities Litigation, 93 F.Supp.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (tracing re-
quirements satisfied even for plaintiffs who purchased in the after market (we note
that Deloitte was among the defendants and it did not even join in the motion to
dismiss under consideration by the court)); American Bank Note Holographics
Securities Litigation (2000); In Neuberger v. Shapiro, 1998 WL 408877, [1998 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 90,261 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (tracing sufficiently
alleged (we note that an accounting firm was among the defendants in this case)); In
re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 747 F.Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y.1990) (some inves-
tors sufficiently pleaded that securities were traceable to an allegedly defective reg-
istration statement although it would have been preferable to have pleaded the dates
on which the shares were purchased (Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 1990); the
claim of the investor who failed to allege that securities were traceable was dismissed
(we note that the defendants included Peat Marwick)); In Lee v. Ernst & Young, LLP,
294 F.3d 969 (8th Cir.2002) (plaintiffs who were aftermarket purchasers could trace
securities to the registration statement (we note that Ernst & Young was among the
defendants)) (Lee v. Ernst & Young, 2002).
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6. Hazen (section 7.3(10)) also explores specific liability risks for accountants,
citing among other cases McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F.Supp. 631, 644-47
(N.D.Cal.1980) reconsideration granted 581 F.Supp. 878 (N.D.Cal.1984); McFarland
v. Memorex Corp. (1980); Steiner v. Southmark Corp., 734 F.Supp. 269
(N.D.Tex.1990) (sufficiently alleging liability of accountants); Steiner v. Southmark
Corp. (1990); Grimm v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, Inc., 1973 WL 495, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder], Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) 96,029 (S.D.N.Y.1973) (Grimm v. Whitney-
Fidalgo Seafoods & Inc., 1973); Jiffy Lube Securities Litigation, 772 F.Supp. 258
(D.Md.1991) (stating a section 11 claim against alleged misstatements attributable to
the auditor) Jiffy Lube Securities Litigation (1991).
7. Ge and McVay (2005) focused on management disclosures in conformance with
section 302 of the Act. They did not report the auditors’ report.
8. Legal exposure comes from current shareholders who can link the report to a
decline in value.
9. Even the four exceptions (Broad Vision Inc.; Foster Wheeler Ltd.; Intelidata
Technologies Corp.; Applied Analytical Industries) received a modified going con-
cern report not directly attributable to the material weakness.
10. Audit detected misstatements may be based on sampling and, thus, projected
to the population. Further, misstatements identified involving estimates such as bad
debts do not represent a ‘‘known’’ or absolute amount but rather must be projected
based on knowledge of the company and industry.
11. The SEC promulgated Rule 10A-3 to implement Section 301 in April 2003. For
directors, ‘‘independence’’ is a legal concept defined in the Act as characterized by not
receiving, other than for board service, any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory
fee from the issuer, and as not being an affiliated person of the issuer, or any subsidiary
thereof. The SEC may make exemptions for certain individuals on a case-by-case basis;
the stock exchanges impose additional requirements in their listing agreements.
12. An expert is defined as a person possessing the following attributes: an un-
derstanding of GAAP and financial statements; the ability to assess the general
application of such principles in connection with accounting estimates, accruals and
reserves; experience preparing, auditing or analyzing financial statements that
present a breadth and level of complexity comparable to the registrants; an under-
standing of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting; and an under-
standing of audit committee functions.
13. Recent events may, however, be changing this. For instance, in the litigation
surrounding the Worldcom fraud, the former directors made personal contributions of
approximately US$24.75 million toward the settlement, rather than the settlement
money coming entirely from the company and/or the proceeds of directors’ and offic-
ers’ (D&O) insurance (see http://www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/849140-1.
html). Similarly, the directors of Enron made personal contributions in the settle-
ment of litigation against them (see http://www.californiaaggie.com/media/storage/
paper981/news/2005/01/19/FrontPage/Former.Enron.Directors.Offer.A.Settlement-13
19224.shtml?norewrite200607280019&sourcedomain=www.californiaaggie.com).
14. On average costs were almost directly proportional to the size of the company
and in 2006 represented an average of 0.06% of revenues. The highest relative costs
were for companies with revenues under $25 million where compliance costs aver-
aged 2.46% of revenues.
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